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Abstract: This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms to reacquire their own 
shares on a separate trading line where only the firm is allowed to buy shares. This temporary 
trading platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange. 
This share repurchase method is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensively 
used by Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchase is unique for two reasons. First, 
unlike open market programs, the repurchasing company does not trade under the cover of 
anonymity. Second, all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publicly available in 
real time to  every market participant. This is a case of instantaneous disclosure which 
contrasts sharply with other markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Using actual 
repurchase data from all buybacks implemented through second trading lines, we find that 
managers exhibit timing ability for the majority of programs. We also document that the daily 
repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. However, we 
reject the opportunistic repurchase  hypothesis and find no evidence that managers exploit 
their information advantage when reacquiring shares. We also find that repurchases on the 
second trading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasing firms (i.e., higher 
trading volumes, smaller bid-ask spreads, and thicker total depths). Exchanges and regulators 
may consider the second trading line an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because of 
its transparency and positive liquidity effects.  
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Executive Summary 
Stock repurchases are nowadays a common way for companies to distribute cash to their 
shareholders.  They are also  frequently used to signal undervaluation,  mitigate agency 
problems, finance or counter the dilution effects of stock option plans, alter leverage ratios, or 
fend off takeovers. Recent empirical research has made tremendous progress in understanding 
the main motives for firms to repurchase their own shares. Careful attention has also been 
devoted to  the usually positive  stock return drift observed subsequent to  share buyback 
announcements but not much is known about the timing.  
The vast majority of buybacks are implemented through open market programs, in which 
listed companies directly buy their own shares in the stock market.  This buyback method 
represents 90% of all repurchase programs in the US and 87% of all repurchase programs in 
the rest of the world. The main features of the open market programs are that  (1) the 
repurchasing firm trades anonymously in the  stock  market and  (2)  the actual number of 
repurchased shares and the repurchase price are not always disclosed. These two reasons 
imply that not much is known about the timing of repurchases and their impact on liquidity. 
This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms to reacquire their own shares on a 
separate trading line where only  the firm is allowed to buy shares. This temporary trading 
platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange. This 
share repurchase method is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensively used by 
Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchase is unique for two reasons. First, unlike 
open market programs, the repurchasing company does not  trade under the cover of 
anonymity. Second, all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publicly available in 
real time to  every market participant.  This is a case of instantaneous disclosure which 
contrasts sharply with other markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Using actual 
repurchase data from all buybacks implemented through second trading lines, we find that 
managers exhibit timing ability for the majority of programs. We also document that the daily 
repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. However, we 
reject the opportunistic repurchase  hypothesis and find no evidence that managers exploit 
their information advantage when reacquiring shares. We also find that repurchases on the 
second trading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasing firms (i.e., higher 
trading volumes, smaller bid-ask spreads, and thicker total depths). Exchanges and regulators 
may consider the second trading line an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because of 
its transparency and positive liquidity effects.    2 




Stock repurchases are nowadays a common way for companies to distribute cash to their 
shareholders.  They are also  frequently used to signal undervaluation (Vermaelen, 1981), 
mitigate agency problems (Jensen, 1986),  finance or counter the dilution effects of  stock 
option plans (Kahle, 2002), alter leverage ratios (Bagwell and Shoven, 1988), or  fend off 
takeovers (Bagwell, 1991). Recent empirical research  has made tremendous progress in 
understanding the main motives for firms to repurchase their own shares.
1 Careful attention 




The vast majority of buybacks are implemented through open market programs, in which 
listed companies directly buy their own shares in the stock market.  This buyback method 
represents 90% of all repurchase programs in the US (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) and 87% 
of all repurchase programs in the rest of the world (Vermaelen, 2005). The main features of 
the open market programs are that (1) the repurchasing firm trades anonymously in the stock 
market and (2)  the actual number of repurchased shares and the repurchase price are not 
always disclosed.
3 An implication of this opaque environment is that open market programs 
may lower the liquidity of repurchasing firms. Indeed, the presence of informed managers in 
the stock market increases the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (Barclay and 
Smith, 1988). This assertion has been recently corroborated by Brockman and Chung (2001) 
in their empirical study of actual buyback data from the Hong Kong stock market. They find 
that spreads increase on average by more than 10% on repurchase days. A similar conclusion 
is reached by Ginglinger and Hamon (2005) using French data. 
 
                                                 
1  See Dittmar, 2000, Grullon and Michaely, 2002, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000, Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely, 2005. 
2  See Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995,  Rau and Vermaelen, 2002, Maxwell and Stephens, 2003, 
Chan, Ikenberry and Lee, 2004, Eberhart and Siddique, 2004, Grullon and Michaely, 2004, McNally and Smith, 
2005, and Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005a,b. 
3 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that most of the U.S. companies do not complete their buybacks, 10% of 
the firms repurchase less than 5% of the number of shares targeted, and a substantial number of firms reacquire 
no share at all.   3 
Another implication of the lack of information on open market programs is that little is known 
about the actual implementation of stock repurchase programs. In the U.S. stock market, since 
most companies repurchase their shares through open market programs with no disclosure 
requirement, researchers are forced to use monthly or quarterly proxies for share repurchase 
activity (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) or questionnaires returned by repurchasing companies 
(Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003, 2004).
4 In particular, it is still an open question  whether 
managers opportunistically use their information advantage around corporate announcements 
when reacquiring shares on behalf of the company.  
 
We present in this paper an alternative repurchase method. This technique allows firms to 
reacquire shares on a s eparate market segment, called  second  trading  line, where the 
repurchasing company is the only entity authorized to acquire shares. This temporary trading 
platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange. The 
second trading line technique has been used by Swiss companies since 1997 and is now the 
most popular share acquisition method in Switzerland. This type of repurchase is unique for 
two reasons. First, unlike open market programs, the repurchasing company does not act 
under the cover of anonymity. As a result,  this institutional design creates a natural 
experiment to study the effect of buybacks on the liquidity  of the original trading line  in 
absence of the adverse selection problem identified by Barclay and Smith (1988). Second, 
these separate trading lines offer a unique resource for analyzing the actual implementation of 
share repurchases. Indeed, all transactions made by the repurchasing firm on a second trading 




There are other important features of the second trading line. The price paid by the firm on the 
second trading line can differ from the concurrent price on the standard first trading line. The 
premium on the second trading line is limited by law to 5% and turns out to be rather small in 
practice. As a result, this type of repurchase fulfills the principle of equal treatment of all 
shareholders, i.e.,  those who  participate in the buyback program and  those who do not. 
Indeed, unlike Dutch auction offers or tender offers, there is no damaging dilution effects on 
                                                 
4 Current research has investigated actual buyback implementation in countries with more stringent disclosure 
requirements such as Canada (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000), Hong Kong (Brockman and Chung, 
2001, Zhang, 2005), Japan (Zhang, 2002), and France (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2005). 
5 This contrasts greatly with the U.S. market where there is no disclosure requirement, or even with countries 
with compulsory periodic disclosures where information on actual repurchases is delayed.   4 
non-selling shareholders caused by substantial premia paid to  selling shareholders.
6 
Furthermore, no disclosure requirements are needed since market participants and financial 
regulatory authorities can follow in real time the firm’s repurchases. On the practical side, the 
second trading lines allow the repurchasing companies to easily collect the withholding tax 
that has to be transferred to the Swiss  tax authorities in every buyback leading to the 
cancellation of the shares.  
 
The first objective of this paper is to study the timing of stock repurchases. We investigate 
whether managers exhibit  buyback implementation skills  when repurchasing shares. We 
define buyback implementation skills as the capability to purchase shares at a relatively low 
price. We use two measures of skills: the first one simply contrasts the actual cost of a given 
buyback program to the average cost of a random buyback plan that yields the same number 
of reacquired shares; the second one is a novel measure that is consistent with the fact that a 
buyback program is an option owned by the firm to buyback stock, as suggested in Ikenberry 
and Vermaelen (1996). In our sample, we find that managers exhibit timing ability for the 
majority of programs. In particular, some companies are able to repurchase shares at the 
lowest possible price during their buyback. 
 
Buyback implementation skills can be demonstrated by active repurchase activities following 
price drops or  in advance of price  increases. Such trading patterns may be related to 
managers’ inside information. Indeed, when implementing buyback programs, management 
teams have the opportunity to  exploit their information advantage  around corporate 
announcements on behalf of the repurchasing firm. The opportunistic repurchase hypothesis 
would be corroborated by particularly intense repurchase activities around the release of firm 
specific information,  and especially  prior to the release of good firm-specific news, and 
following the release of bad firm-specific news. To the best of our knowledge, there is only 
one empirical study (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2004) that analyzes the relationship between 
firm-specific news and the daily repurchase decision of firms. They report that firms refrain 
from repurchasing around public announcements. Since their dataset has been voluntary 
disclosed by the companies, this result is not overwhelmingly surprising. Using our unique 
                                                 
6 In Dutch auction offers, shareholders submit to the firm quantities and prices at which they are willing to sell 
their shares (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). The share price eventually paid is the minimum one allowing the 
repurchasing firms to reacquire the targeted number of shares. Tender offers are fixed-price offers (Vermaelen, 
1984). When the number of tendered shares exceeds the targeted number of shares, the company can either 
expand its offer or buy shares proportionally.    5 
dataset, we examine this question using an innovative methodology contrasting pre- and post-
announcement periods, as well as trading patterns around good and bad news releases. We 
uncover evidence that  the daily repurchase decision is strongly associated with (past and 
future) short-term price changes. However, in our sample, we reject  the  opportunistic 
repurchase hypothesis and  find no evidence of firms increasing their repurchases before 
releasing good news or after disclosing bad news. 
 
Our  second objective is to analyze the impact of share buybacks on the liquidity of the 
repurchasing firm on the first trading line. As second trading lines are open concurrently with 
first trading lines in the Swiss stock exchange, it is likely that this parallel trading affects in 
some way the liquidity of the underlying stock. When share buybacks take place on a separate 
trading line, existing theories linking buybacks and market liquidity do not straightforwardly 
apply. Repurchasing firms do not compete directly with the liquidity providers on the first 
trading line (Barclay and Smith, 1988, and Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2004). Furthermore, 
this type of repurchase does not increase the probability of trading with an informed trader on 
the first trading line (Barclay and Smith, 1988, and Brockman and Chung, 2001). In this 
paper, we posit that the impact of firms’ repurchases on the liquidity of the underlying stock is 
generated in part by the information effect of actual buybacks. Since actual buybacks are 
instantaneously disclosed to all market participants, the firm sends a positive signal to the 
market every time it trades. We hypothesize that this signal attracts more investors to the 
market in reaction to firms’ repurchases and consequently improve market liquidity. 
Furthermore, the expected impact of  repurchases on stock market liquidity also depends on 
the identity of the sellers. First, if second trading lines capture a substantial part of the trading 
volume of institutional investors, that otherwise would have taken place on the first trading 
line, the liquidity on the first trading line is likely to worsen. Second, if most transactions on 
second trading lines are made by arbitrageurs, who simultaneously buy on the first trading 
line and resell to the firm, the liquidity of the underlying stock is likely to improve. Indeed, 
arbitrage activity maintains a minimum price in the stock market, which tends to raise trading 
volumes and lower bid-ask spreads.  
 
Our empirical results confirm that repurchases on the second trading line have an important 
impact on the liquidity of repurchasing firms. Specifically, the repurchasing firms’ trading 
volumes and total depths on the first trading line tend to be higher on repurchase days and   6 
bid-ask spreads tend to be smaller on repurchase days. The evidence confirms that this unique 
parallel trading mechanism improves the liquidity of the underlying stock. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze share repurchases implemented 
on  an exchange with instantaneous buyback disclosure. While this method is only used in 
Switzerland, it can be of interest for exchanges and regulators in other countries because of its 
transparency and positive liquidity effects. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 describes the institutional and legal setting of stock repurchases in Switzerland, 
along with the participation rules for all types of stock market participants. Section 3 provides 
a detailed description of the dataset. We study the timing of share repurchases in Section 4. 
Specifically, we assess the buyback implementation skills of  managers and we study the 
effect of stock price evolution and firm-specific news on repurchase activity. We analyze the 
liquidity effects of stock repurchases in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding 
comments. 
 
2. Share Repurchases in Switzerland 
 
2.1. Institutional and Legal Setting 
The first share repurchase program implemented by a company listed on the Swiss stock 
exchange took place in 1993 and since then 129 programs have been carried out (see Figure 1, 
upper graph). Swiss firms buy their own shares using four different buyback methods: open 
market, distribution of tradable European put options to all shareholders, tender offers, and 
repurchases on a second trading line. This last repurchasing technique was initiated in 1997 
and has become very popular since then (see Figure 1, lower graphs).
7 
 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
 
Swiss corporate law states that, when shares are repurchased on a second trading line, share 
buybacks should not exceed 10% of the votes and firm’s issued share capital, they should not 
take place ten days prior to the earnings announcement date, and the premium paid on  a 
second trading line should not exceed 5% of the price prevailing  in the stock market at the 
                                                 
7 The interruption in the use of put options between 1994 and 1999 is due to the fact that put options used to be 
taxed twice: first when granted and later when exercised. In 2000, the highest court in Switzerland ruled that 
options should only be taxed at the exercise date.   7 
same time. Moreover, the firm shall interrupt repurchases  if  it  is in possession of price 
sensitive information. Furthermore, any repurchase program exceeding 2% of the  share 
capital has to get the approval of the Swiss Takeover Board since a buyback program is 
considered as a takeover of the company of its own shares. Once approval is granted, the 
program can be implemented on the stock exchange, typically under the operational control of 
an investment bank. According to Swiss exchange regulations, when a second trading line is 
open, off-exchange transactions are prohibited. When the program is completed, the 
cancellation of shares (if any) has to be approved by the shareholders during the following 
annual general meeting (see Appendix for an example). 
 
As an illustration, we present in Figure 2 the concurrent order books on the first and second 
trading lines for UBS recorded on July 11, 2005 at 4:40 p.m. Both trading lines are open on 
the Virt-X, which is a fully electronic, order-driven trading platform.
8 Orders are entered into 
the trading system by the various participants and automatically routed to a central order 
book. Execution of the orders takes place in keeping with the principle of price-time priority. 
Market participants can submit different types of orders: market orders, limit orders, hidden 
orders, and fill-or-kill orders. The observation of the two order books illustrates different 
aspects of this share repurchase mechanism. First, as expected, the firm is the only buyer on 
the second trading line. Second, first trading lines are much more active than second trading 
lines and, as a consequence, spreads tend to be wider on second trading lines. Third and 
unlike on first trading lines, posted orders are round lots on second trading lines. This is due 
the fact that only professional investors are selling shares on the second line as will be shown 
in the next subsection. 
 
< Insert Figure 2 > 
 
The growing popularity of the second trading line is mostly due to its great flexibility. Unlike 
distributions of put options or tender offers, second trading line programs do not commit the 
firm to acquire a specified number of shares at a fixed price. The length of the program also 
offers some flexibility since a given program implemented on a second trading line can easily 
be extended. Finally,  trading on the first trading line is not interrupted. As a result, any 
                                                 
8 Virt-X is a pan-European stock market for European Blue Chips which was launched on June 25, 2001. Swiss 
firms can be traded (first and second trading lines) either on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX) or on Virt-X.   8 
investor willing to sell her shares can, in theory, trade on both market segments. However, we 
will see that for tax reasons this choice may in some cases only be on paper. 
 
Before discussing the tax treatment of share repurchases in Switzerland, a few basic tax 
principles have to be  explained.  Generally, share buybacks are taxed as capital gains in 
countries where individuals are subject to taxes on capital gains and as dividends elsewhere 
(for an excellent review of the relevant issues, see Vermaelen, 2005). In Switzerland, capital 
gains are not taxed for individual investors, while dividends are taxed as income. Technically 
speaking, when paying dividends a company retains 35% of the amount (i.e., the withholding 
tax), which are directly paid to the tax authorities. As long as the shareholder declares the 
dividend as income, she is able to reclaim her withholding tax in full.
9 The dividend will then 
be taxed as ordinary income for individual investors. On the other hand, institutional investors 
are taxed on both dividends and capital gains.
10 At the end of the fiscal year, institutional 
investors are also entitled to full reimbursement of the withholding tax. 
 
The tax treatment of share buybacks depends on their purpose. If companies repurchase 
shares to hold them as treasury stock, then no  withholding  taxes are  levied and  stock 
repurchases are considered ordinary sales.
11 This situation is encountered for instance when 
shares are repurchased to finance stock option plans, to guarantee the execution of convertible 
bonds, or to prepare future acquisitions. In this case, open market buyback is the most flexible 
repurchase method.  Otherwise, if c ompanies repurchase shares to cancel them, then the 
difference between the repurchase price and the nominal value, or par value, of the stock is 
treated as a liquidation dividend.
12 The withholding tax is then equal to 0.35 · (P2,t – V), 
where P2,t is the stock price on the second trading line and V is the nominal value of the stock. 
The repurchasing company has to transfer the withholding tax to the tax authorities. When the 
firm is not able to identify the seller of the stock, the firm is personally responsible for paying 
the withholding tax. As fiscal authorities consider that the amount paid to shareholders has 
been deduced from withholding taxes, the company bears a 53.85% tax rate, i.e., 0.35 · (1 / 
0.65) = 0.5385. This specific tax regime called for the creation of a new share acquisition 
                                                 
9 For foreign investors, the portion that can be reclaimed is determined by bilateral tax treaties. For instance, U.S. 
and British investors are eligible for a 20 percent points tax return. 
10 Some institutional investors, such as pension funds and holdings, are totally exempted from taxes on dividends 
and capital gains. They still face the withholding tax though. 
11 Swiss companies can hold treasury stock for up to six years. However, if at the end of this period the shares 
have not been resold in the market, the firm will have to pay the withholding tax. 
12 Typically, for Swiss companies, the nominal value is less than 1% of the current market stock price.   9 
mechanism allowing the firm to pay only the net price to the shareholders. The goal for the 
firm is to be able to collect immediately the withholding tax when the stock is tendered while 
keeping a flexible "open-market type” program.
13 Actually, on a second trading line, 
participating  shareholders only get the price net of the withholding tax so that the company 
does not bear the risk of paying additional taxes. From the firm’s perspective, the use of a 
second trading line is a tax-efficient way of cancelling shares. 
 
2.2. Buyback Participation Rules 
In order to better understand the functioning of the second trading line buybacks from a tax 
point of view, we study the conditions under which a given market participant may take part 
in a second trading line repurchase program. In particular, we wonder by which percentage 
(i.e., premium) the price on the second trading line has to exceed the current stock price to 
make the second trading line attractive to this participant. We consider successively individual 
investors, institutional investors, and arbitrageurs. We compute the reserve premium of each 
participant, which is defined as the premium  for which the after-tax price on the second 
trading line is equal to the after-tax price on the first trading line. Consequently, when the 
actual premium p exceeds the reserve premium, the investor is better off selling her shares on 
the second trading line rather than in the stock market.
14 
 
When an individual investor sells some shares in the stock market at the current stock price, 
no taxes are paid since capital gains are tax free for individual investors. If the same investor 
tenders her shares on the second trading line, she receives today the second trading line price 
net of the withholding tax. At the end of the fiscal year, she will be entitled to a full refund of 
the withholding tax and the difference between the repurchase price and the nominal value of 
the stock will be taxed as income. Therefore, an individual investor would prefer the second 
trading line if and only if: 
 
4 4 3 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1
tax   income   of   value   Present
I
refund   tax   ng  withholdi of   value   Present tax   ng  withholdi less   price   line   trading   2nd
d V]t   - p) [P(1 - V]0.35d   -   p) [P(1     V]0.35 - p) [P(1   -   p) P(1        P + + + + + <  
or equivalently, 
                                                 
13 Tender offers or put option-based repurchase programs also allow the company to pay only the net price but 
with much less flexibility since both the price and the number of shares are fixed. 
14 The following analysis remains valid for foreign investors but they usually would not be entitled to a full 
refund of the  withholding tax. As a result, their reserve premium is higher than the one of their domestic 
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where p
* is the reserve premium for an individual investor, P is the market stock price, and tI 
is the marginal income tax rate. The discount factor d is defined as (1 + r)
-t where r is the 
risk-free rate with a t  maturity and t is the time period from the transaction day to the end of 
the fiscal year. 
 
When an institutional investor sells some shares in the stock market, capital gains are taxed at 
the effective marginal rate tG. If the same investor tenders her shares on the second trading 
line, she receives today the second trading line price minus the withholding tax. At the end of 
the fiscal year, she will be entitled to a full refund of the withholding tax and the difference 
between the repurchase price and the acquisition price will be taxed as capital gains. 
Therefore, an institutional investor would prefer the second trading line if and only if: 
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where p
** is the reserve premium for an institutional investor and A is the acquisition price of 
the stock. Notice that, since the acquisition price does not appear in the expression  for the 
reserve premium, the latter is independent of the investor’s capital gains or loss.  In the 
eventuality that the institutional investor is exempted from capital gain tax, the participation 
rule becomes: 
 
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1
refund   tax   ng  withholdi of   value   Present tax   ng  withholdi less   price   line   trading   2nd
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where p
*** is the reserve premium for a tax-exempted institutional investor. As expected the 
reserve premium is smaller when the institutional investor is exempted from taxes on capital 
gains.   11 
 
As the firm’s shares are traded concurrently on two parallel market segments, arbitrageurs 
may seek to exploit any significant price difference. A professional arbitrageur will accept to 
buy one share on the first trading line and to sell it on the second trading line if and only if her 
arbitrage profit is strictly positive: 
 
0 d P]t - p) [P(1 - V]0.35d   -   p) [P(1     V]0.35 - p) [P(1   -   p) P(1    P -
tax   gain   capital   of   value   Present
G
refund   tax   ng  withholdi of   value   Present tax   ng  withholdi less   price   line   trading   2nd
> + + + + + + 4 4 3 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 . 
 
By simplifying the inequality above, we get Equation (2). Therefore, the reserve premium for 
an arbitrageur is equal to the reserve premium for an institutional investor. 
  
The three reserve premia obtained above share a common structure. The numerator is the 
same in  Equations (2) and (3) and this t erm also appears in  Equation (1). This term 
corresponds to the opportunity cost of the withholding tax to the investor. Of course, the 
actual reserve premia will depend on the marginal tax rate of the different types of investors. 
In two particular cases this opportunity cost is equal to zero. First, if the withholding tax was 
immediately returned to the seller (d = 1), which is equivalent to no withholding tax, the 
reserve premium of any institutional investor or arbitrageur would boil down to zero (p** = 
p*** = 0). In the case where d = 1, the reserve premium for an individual investor would 
remain strictly positive (p* > 0). This is due to the fact that an individual investor needs to be 
compensated for the income tax  she has to pay on the difference between  V and P when 
selling on a second trading line. Second, if the current stock price and the nominal value of 
the stock were equal (V / P = 1), the reserve premium of all market participants would be 
zero. This would correspond to the case where there would be no tax basis for paying the 
withholding tax. This result emphasizes the central role played by the  V /  P ratio in 
determining the magnitude of the premium.  
 
We plot  in Figure 3 the reserve premia for different market participants. For each market 
participant, we plot the associated reserve premium for a time period until the end of the fiscal 
year (t) ranging from 0 to 1 year, different risk-free interest rate levels, r = 1%, 3%, and 5%, 
and different income tax rates (tI) or capital gain tax rates (tG), 30% and 50%. The value of the 
current stock price ( P) is assumed to be 100 and the nominal value of one share (V) is 
assumed to be 1. The reserve premium of an individual investor turns out to be very large, 
regardless of the magnitude of the key parameters. Since the premium is limited by law to   12 
5%, we conclude that it is never optimal for an individual investor to sell shares on a second 
trading line. On the other hand, the reserve premium of institutional investors and arbitrageurs 
always remain below the legal threshold. As a result, the other market participants may accept 
to participate in a second trading line buyback program. In particular, if p
** < p, institutional 
investors and arbitrageurs may sell shares on the second trading line, and if p
*** < p < p
**, 
only tax-exempted institutional investors may sell shares on the second trading line.  The 
bottom line is that the tax treatment of second line trading makes it attractive for institutional 
and professional investors only. 
 
< Insert Figure 3 > 
 
3. Characterizing Repurchase Trading 
 
Our sample contains all buybacks implemented by firms listed on the Swiss stock exchange 
(SWX) or Virt-X through a second trading line between its introduction in December 1997 
and August 2004. For each of the 55 programs, we obtained from SWX the daily transaction 
price on the second trading line and the Swiss Franc repurchase, which is the total amount 
spent in repurchasing shares by the firm on a given day. Our sample contains a total of 11,742 
day/program observations. In addition, we collect from the Swiss Takeover Board website 
(www.copa.ch), the start and the end dates, the maximum cost and the percentage issued share 
capital reduction  of each program, along with the main motives for repurchasing shares 
claimed by each firm. We also retrieve contemporaneous daily stock prices on the first trading 
line for all repurchasing companies from Thomson Financial Datastream. Furthermore, we 
collect from the same source the market capitalizations and book-to-market value ratios of the 
repurchasing companies during all programs. 
 
Within a given repurchase program  i, we measure the trading activity using  four different 
variables, which capture different facets of stock repurchases. The first variable is a dummy 
variable that is assigned a value of one if the company repurchases any stock on day t, and 0 
otherwise: 
 
Buybacki,t = 1 if SRi,t > 0   and   Buybacki,t = 0 if SRi,t = 0      (4) 
   13 
where SRi is the Swiss Franc repurchase. The second variable captures the intensity of the 
repurchase activity and is defined as the fraction of the announced program size repurchased 
on day t: 
 
i t , i t , i Size ogram Pr / SR Intensity =           (5) 
 
where Program Sizei is the maximum cost of program i announced and authorized prior to the 
program implementation. The third variable is the percentage premium paid on the second 
trading line on a given day: 
 
Premiumi,t = (P2,i,t - P1,i,t) / P1,i,t          (6) 
 
where P1,i is the stock price on the first trading line while P2,i is the stock price on the second 
trading line. The fourth variable is the completion rate, which is the percent of the program 





s , i t , i Size ogram Pr / SR Completion ￿
=
=         (7) 
where ti
start is the start date of program i.  
 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the repurchasing firms and their repurchase 
activity. A salient feature of our dataset is that repurchasing firms tend to be larger and have 
larger market-to-book value ratios ( growth firms) than non-repurchasing firms.  Among 
repurchasing firms, the largest caps primarily use the second trading line or the open market 
methods. Typically, these buyback programs last between six months and a year. Regardless 
of the selected technique, each program targets a significant portion of the firms’ share capital 
ranging from 4% to 12%. As expected all second trading lines program aim at canceling the 
repurchased shares. 
 
During our sample period, all programs conducted on a second trading line have amounted for 
a total cost of 56.5 billion Swiss Francs (hereafter CHF). While repurchase programs exhibit 
great diversity in their size, the average program  size is slightly above CHF1 billion. The 
average share capital reduction is 6.70%, which is comparable with the target percentage of 
shares in the US (Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2004). The typical completion rate of 70% is 
slightly below the figures reported by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) for U.S. firms, which 
range from 74%  to 82%. Firms acquiring shares on a second trading line pay an average   14 
premium of 0.78% on top of the stock market price. On average, firms buy 28.81% of the 
trading days, but repurchasing frequencies vary considerably across firms. Swiss companies 
tend to repurchase shares more aggressively at the beginning of the buyback program but do 
not seem to favor any particular day of the week. 
 
Firms set up second trading lines so that they can cancel their shares. Share buybacks for 
cancellation and cash dividends are complementary tools for returning cash to shareholders. 
As reported in the lower panel of Table 1, companies cancel their repurchased shares to show 
improvement in financial ratios and to alter capital structure. Another reason for canceling the 
shares is that a heavy tax penalty  would be levied  if  firms keep the reacquired shares as 
treasury stock beyond a specified period (see Section 2.1).   
 
< Insert Table 1 > 
 
Figure  4 displays the daily repurchase activity of  Swiss Re, Swatch Group, UBS, and 
Schindler. We clearly see in this figure that these firms adopt a variety of execution styles. 
For instance, Swiss Re and Schindler concentrate their repurchase activity during a single 
short period following a strong bearish period for the companies. This trading pattern is 
consistent with the price-support hypothesis. Both firms have been able to repurchase shares 
at the lowest possible price during their buyback. Differently, actual repurchases of Swatch 
Group and UBS are more evenly spread out during the course of their program. UBS 
repurchase between 0.5% and 1.5% of the program on a daily basis with only two blackout 
periods preceding the firm’s earnings announcements.  
 
Figure 5 presents the premia paid by  Helvetia and Ciba Specialty Chemicals on the second 
trading line, along with the cumulative percentage of the program completed by Novartis and 
Credit Suisse Group. While the premia always remain below the 5% legal threshold, the ones 
paid by  Helvetia tend to be larger than the ones paid by Ciba Specialty Chemicals. This is 
mainly caused by the drop in the Swiss risk-free interest rate from 3% in June 2001 to 0.5% in 
August 2003. The lower graphs in Figure 5 present one firm (Novartis) that fully completes 
its buyback program and one company (Credit Suisse Group) that stops repurchasing after 
completing only 20% of its buyback program. While both companies seem to favor the first 
portion of the program to reacquire shares, Novartis keeps buying shares until the very end of 
its program.   15 
< Insert Figures 4 and 5 > 
 
4. Repurchase Timing 
 
4.1. Buyback Implementation Skills 
We define the buyback implementation skills of managers as their ability in selecting 
repurchase days over the course of a given buyback program. In this context, a particularly 
skilled manager is able to reacquire shares at historical low  prices.
15 In order to assess 
managers’ timing skills, we first contrast the actual cost of a given buyback program, which is 
measured by adding up all daily Swiss Franc repurchases, Ci, to the average cost of a random 
buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares,  i C . We call the  i i C / C  ratio 
the buyback implementation skills (BIS) variable. Applying this approach to data from the 
Hong Kong stock exchange, Brockman and Chung (2001) find that managers pay on average 
less than the average cost of a random repurchase strategy leading to the same number of 
reacquired shares. 
 
In this paper, we propose a novel measure of managers’ buyback implementation skills that is 
consistent with the fact that a buyback program is an option owned by the firm to buyback 
stock, as suggested in Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996).
16 Indeed, open market and second 
trading lines programs give managers give the opportunity  – but not the obligation  – to 
buyback shares during a given time period. In particular, they provide managers with the 
flexibility to forego repurchasing stock. Consistent with this analogy between buybacks and 
financial options, we compare on each repurchase day the price paid by the firm (i.e., the 
“strike price”) to the average price during the rest of the buyback program (i.e., during the 
“remaining l ife of the repurchase option”).  For each buyback program, we assess the 
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OBIS      (8) 
 
                                                 
15 Our test for the implementation skills focuses on the managers’ ability in minimizing costs. We recognize that 
firms can have other objectives when they repurchase shares. The presence of these firms in our sample will bias 
against us in finding significant implementation skills in our empirical tests. 
16 We thank Theo Vermaelen for suggesting the idea underlying this measure of buyback implementation skills.   16 
where Ci is the actual cost of the program and 
+
i C  is the average cost of a random buyback 
plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares  except that  the average price is 
computed over the period following a given repurchase day. In addition, Ti is the end date of 
the program, 
i T : t , i , 2 P
~
 denotes the average price on the second trading line between the current 
date and the end of the program, and Ni,t is the number of shares repurchased on a given day. 
Since the stock price on the second trading line is only observed when a transaction takes 
place on this market segment, we define  i , 2 P
~
 as  t , i , 2 t , i , 2 P P
~
=  if  SRi,t > 0 and 
) p 1 ( P P
~
t , i t , i , 1 t , i , 2 + · =  if  SRi,t = 0 where  t , i p  is the average premium paid during this 
program.
17 The average price on the second trading line can then be extracted from the time-




We can grasp the essence of the OBIS measure  intuitively. The first term in Equation (8) 
captures whether the price paid by the company at a given point in time is less than the 
average price over the remainder of the program. Note that we only consider future stock 
prices in order to be consistent with the idea that, when repurchasing, the firm exercises an 
option to buy a stock that may have been exercised at any point until the expiration of the 
buyback program. The second term in Equation (8) is a weighting factor reflecting the relative 
importance of a given daily repurchase. 
 
For each variable of buyback implementation skills ( BIS and OBIS), w e interpret a value 
greater than one as evidence of buyback implementation skills whereas ratios smaller than one 
can mean either no skills or incompetence. To assess the statistical significance of each skills 
measure, we compute a t -statistic for each program using the bootstrapping approach of 
Brockman and Chung (2001). We consider as given for each program (1) the repurchasing 
period, (2) the total number of reacquired shares, and (3) the number of reacquired shares 
during each repurchase day. For each program, we randomly generate 50,000 repurchase 
strategies h olding constant (1), (2), and (3) and we only allow the timing of the strategy to 
vary from simulation to simulation.
18 From the bootstrapped distribution of the average cost, 
we compute for each program the standard-deviation of the skills measure and the t-statistic. 
                                                 
17 We compute a weighted-average premium where the weight on a given day is equal to the fraction of the 
buyback program repurchased on that day.  
18 For the BIS measure, we bootstrap using all possible prices whereas for the OBIS measure we associate the 
number of shares repurchased on day t only with future prices that are observed between t and T.   17 
 
We show in Table 2 that the BIS measure identifies 15 programs for which managers display 
significant buyback implementation skills, whereas the OBIS measure classifies 24 programs 
as programs with significant implementation skills.
19  For the programs with significant BIS, 
the mean (median) cost represents on average 113.2% (109.2%) of the actual cost. According 
to the OBIS measure, the actual cost paid by firms with significant buyback implementation 
skills is 11.7% less than the mean cost and 6.0% less than the median cost. Depending on the 
measure of timing ability, we find that the proportion of the programs that display significant 
buyback implementation skills at the 5% level is between 28% and 45%, which is comparable 
to the timing performance of managers in  Hong  Kong analyzed in Brockman and Chung 
(2001). The remaining programs in our sample display either no buyback implementation 
skills or some significant bad timing. A simple regression analysis (results not reported) 
shows that buyback implementation ability is significantly positively associated with the 
program length and share capital reduction but not associated with the average premium. In 
the following subsection, we question whether  buyback implementation skills reflect the 
strategic behavior of the managers in charge of implementing the buybacks. 
 
< Insert Table 2 > 
 
4.2. Strategic Trading 
In order to pursue one step further our analysis of the timing of buybacks, w e study the 
relationship between stock repurchase activity, stock prices, and firm-specific information. 
Most of the empirical studies on insider trading analyze the impact on share prices or market 
liquidity of individuals with private information (Meulbroek, 1992, Cornell and Sirri, 1992, 
and Fishe and Robe, 2004) and insiders’ abnormal performance when trading on their own 
account (Seyhun,  1986, and  Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003).  For instance, Lee, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1992) find that officers and directors of repurchasing firms tend to 
reduce their selling and, in some cases, increase their buying prior to fixed-price offers in 
order to personally benefit from the buybacks.  
 
                                                 
19 Among the four programs detailed in Figure 4, only Swiss Re ( BIS = 1.333 with t-statistic = 7.14)  and 
Schindler (BIS = 1.471, t-statistic = 3.86) exhibit significant timing ability according to the BIS measure. Swatch 
Group is characterized by a  BIS of 1.025 and a t-statistic of 1.17, while UBS displays a BIS of 1.001 and a t-
statistic of 0.09. According to the OBIS measure, Swiss Re, Schindler, and Swatch Group exhibit significant 
implementation skills.    18 
When implementing buyback programs, management teams can opportunistically use their 
information advantage around corporate announcements on behalf of the company (Barclay 
and Smith, 1988).  Their actions may  however be restricted by guidelines or safe harbor’s 
bounds established by stock exchanges, or even blackout periods preceding earnings 
disclosures.
20 If managers make use of private i nformation to time share repurchases, one 
would expect higher repurchase activities around the release of firm specific information, but 
especially prior to the release of good firm-specific news, and after the release of bad firm-
specific news. The abnormal repurchase activities should be particularly high if the market 
overreacts to bad news. Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) show for a sample of U .S. firms 
that repurchase activity is significantly curtailed around firm-specific information releases. 
They conclude that trading on private information is not evident in their sample. 
 
To detect any abnormal trading activity around the release of firm-specific news, we pool all 
the programs and estimate the following PROBIT regression model: 
 
Buybacki,t = a + b1 Ri,t-5,t-1 + b2 Ri,t + b3 Ri, t+1,t+5 + g1 Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g2 Newsi,t + g3 Newsi,t+1,t+5 
 + d1-5 Controlsi,t + ei,t      (9) 
 
where Buybacki is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero 
otherwise and Ri is the return of firm i on a given day. The variable News is a binary variable 
set to one if the firm makes a public announcement on a given day and zero otherwise. We 
retrieve every news item using the Dow Jones & Reuters Factiva database.
21 We break down 
the period surrounding a firm-specific information release into a five day pre-release period, a 
release day, and a five day post-release period. Controls represents a set of control variables 
including the firm’s market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and 
percentage share capital reduction, and the buyback completion rate up to date. 
 
We report in Table 3 the parameter estimates for all programs, as well as for programs with 
significant buyback implementation skills. We find that firms repurchase more frequently in 
                                                 
20 Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003) use questionnaires returned by U.S. repurchasing firms to document claimed 
and actual compliance to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines. For their set of fifty-four 
companies, they show that virtually all firms violate at one time or at another the safe harbor’s bounds advised 
by the SEC. 
21 We limit the search to news items announced by the Swiss News Agency (ATS). We only consider firm-
specific news items and do not include general news items in which a company is only mentioned.  In the 
eventuality that the release takes place after the closing time of the stock market, we use the following day as the 
announcement day.   19 
days following price drops ( 0 ˆ
1 < b ). This behavior is even more pronounced for those firms 
with significant implementation skills.
22  This result is consistent with U.S. and Canadian 
evidence reported by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (2000) using quarterly and monthly data, respectively. It is also consistent with the 
few studies using daily repurchase data (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2004 and Zhang, 2005). 
Furthermore, we find that firms repurchase more frequently when the contemporaneous return 
on the stock is negative ( 0 ˆ
2 < b ). These first two pieces of evidence are consistent with the 
price-support hypothesis. 
 
Unlike previous empirical studies,  we find that repurchasing firms appear to consistently 
repurchase in advance of price increases ( 0 ˆ
3 > b ). This unusual result may be caused by the 
very nature of the second trading line method. Indeed, as transactions on second trading lines 
are  instantaneous  public information, market participants  can interpret a repurchase as a 
positive signal revealing that the company’s management team estimates that the stock is 
currently undervalued.  Alternatively, the  evidence  may  suggest that Swiss managers  can 
anticipate future price changes. Overall we conclude that the firms included in our sample are 
price-sensitive repurchasers. 
 
< Insert Table 3 > 
 
For the full sample of programs, we find that repurchasing firms are more active after a public 
announcement and less active prior to a public announcement. We observe a similar trading 
pattern when we only focus on programs with implementation skills. This general reluctance 
to trade before a news release is particularly strong prior to quarterly and annual earnings 
announcements. This last point supports the idea that Swiss companies strictly conform to 
Swiss regulation prohibiting repurchasing during the 10-day period preceding earnings 
announcements or the release of any price-sensitive information. 
 
The findings regarding control variables are generally consistent with expectations.  For 
instance, l arge firms, which have been very active in repurchasing shares over our sample 
period, tend to trade more frequently, everything else being  constant. Moreover, the daily 
                                                 
22 We use the BIS variable to select the firms exhibiting significant implementation skills since this measure is 
the more conservative than the OBIS measure.   20 
repurchase decision  turns  out  to be negatively related to the length of the program and 
positively related to the relative size of the buyback program. 
 
To investigate further the effect of public announcements on the daily buyback decision, we 
contrast trading patterns around good news and bad news. To do so, we estimate the following 
PROBIT regression model: 
 
Buybacki,t = a + b1 Ri,t-5,t-1 + b2 Ri,t + b3 Ri,t+1,t+5 + g1 Good Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g2 Good Newsi,t + g3 Good 
Newsi,t+1,t+5 + g4 Bad Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g5 Bad Newsi,t + g6 Bad Newsi,t+1 ,t+5 + d1-5 Controlsi,t + ei,t   (10) 
 
where Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one 
if the firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as 
good (respectively bad) if the return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the 
announcement day.  In this regression model, four estimates allow us to detect whether 
managers behave opportunistically when implementing repurchase programs. Strategic 
trading would consist in repurchasing before good news releases (g3 > 0) since stock prices are 
likely to increase after such announcements, and after bad news releases (g4 > 0) since stock 
prices are likely to decrease after such announcements. For similar reasons, i t would also 
imply  not to repurchase right after a good news release (g1 < 0) and just before a bad news 
release (g6 < 0). 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results. We see that firms are more likely to repurchase their 
shares after releasing good news and less likely to do so prior to releasing good news, which 
is in clear opposition to the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis. Moreover, we do not detect 
any abnormal repurchase activity following bad news releases. The only piece of supportive 
evidence of the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis is that firms in our sample curtail their 
repurchases in the five-day period preceding the release of bad news ( 6 ˆ g  < 0). We reach 
similar conclusions when we limit the analysis to earnings announcements only. However, in 
this case, the pre-announcement trading  blackout is much stronger and independent of the 
news content. 
 
As a robustness check, we repeat the same analysis using  abnormal returns in excess of the 
market return instead of raw returns to separate good news and bad news. In that case, a given   21 
piece of news is said to be good (respectively bad) if the abnormal return of the concerned 
company is positive (negative) on the announcement day.  We see in Table  5 that o ur 
conclusions remain unchanged.  
 
< Insert Tables 4 and 5 > 
 
Our methodology allows us to analyze the timing of buybacks controlling for the possibility 
of  opportunistic trading based on private information. While  implementation ability is the 
faculty to repurchase stock at a relatively low price, typically after a price drop or prior to a 
price increase, opportunistic trading consists of using private information around corporate 
announcements to time actual  repurchases. We claim that, once implementation ability has 
been identified, the burden of the proof  of  opportunistic trading  is still upon researchers’ 
shoulders.  It requires a careful analysis of the daily repurchase decision around public 
announcements. In our sample, we find that managers exhibit implementation ability for the 
majority of programs. We also document that the daily repurchase decision is statistically 
associated with short-term price changes. However, we reject the opportunistic repurchase 
hypothesis and find no evidence of firms increasing their repurchases before releasing good 
news or after disclosing bad news. 
 
5. Trading Activity and Corporate Liquidity 
 
While in the previous section we intended to answer the question “When do firms 
repurchase?”, we now consider the related question “Is the liquidity on the first trading line 
different when firms repurchase?”. Two contending hypotheses have been developed in the 
literature to explain the liquidity effect of open market share buybacks. Barclay and Smith 
(1988) posit that a repurchasing company can narrow the bid-ask spread by maintaining a 
minimum price on the market, and thus tends to increase the market liquidity. Alternatively, 
Barclay and Smith suggest that the presence of a repurchasing firm with superior information 
may widen spreads, and thus decrease the stock market liquidity, because the probability of 
trading with an informed trader increases.  The empirical evidence on the effects of open 
market repurchases on stock market liquidity is conflicting. On one hand, Franz, Rao and 
Tripathy (1995),  and  Cook, Krigman and Leach ( 2004) conclude that open  market 
repurchases by U.S. firms positively  contribute  to market liquidity by narrowing bid-ask 
spreads. On the other hand, Barclay and Smith (1988), Brockman and Chung (2001), and   22 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2005) find that open market repurchases in the US, Hong Kong, and 
France respectively, have a detrimental effect on liquidity.  Differently, Wiggins (1994), 
Singh, Zaman and Krishnamurti (1994), and Miller and McConnell (1995) find no impact on 
the bid-ask spread of repurchasing firms. 
 
As far as second trading lines are concerned, the two aforementioned  hypotheses do not 
straightforwardly apply. Indeed, when trading on a separate trading line, the company is not 
competing directly with the liquidity providers, nor is it increasing the probability of trading 
with an informed trader in the stock market. We claim that the existence of the second trading 
line affects the liquidity of the first trading line (1) through the information effect of actual 
buybacks and (2) through the identity of the sellers on the second trading line.  
 
The information effect works as follows. Since actual buybacks on the second trading line are 
instantaneously disclosed to all market participants, the firm sends a positive signal to the 
market every time it trades. If the firm’s managers are assumed to be better informed than the 
rest of the market, the positive signal from the firm attracts more investors on the first trading 
line which ceteris paribus tends to increase trading activity and improve liquidity. 
 
The impact of second trading line programs on the stock market liquidity also depends on the 
identity of the sellers on the second trading line. First, i f second trading lines capture a 
substantial part of the trading volume of institutional investors, that otherwise would have 
taken place in the stock market, stock market liquidity is likely to deteriorate. Second, if most 
of the trading on second trading lines is made by arbitrageurs, who simultaneously buy in the 
stock market and resell on the second trading line, stock market liquidity is likely to benefit 
from this parallel trading. Indeed, arbitrage activity maintains a minimum price in the stock 
market, which tends to raise trading volumes and lower bid-ask spreads. As shown in Section 
2.2, institutional investors and arbitrageurs are equally likely to participate in a second trading 
line program since their reserve premium are equal. We then conduct an empirical analysis to 
see which scenario is born out by the data.  
 
We first analyze the effects of actual buybacks on the repurchasing firms’ trading volumes on 
the first trading line. The key variable is the firm’s trading volume measured in  number of 
shares. Daily  trading volumes,  closing bid and ask prices, and opening prices  have been 
collected from Thomson Financial Datastream. In order to contrast the trading activity during   23 
repurchase days and non-repurchase days, w e compare the average and median  trading 
volumes when the company does repurchase with the average level of the variable when the 
company does not repurchase.
23 When computing the mean and median of the firm-specific 
scaled liquidity measures across programs. We find that, on average, trading volumes are 
higher on repurchase days than on non-repurchase days. Around 84.6% of the firms in our 
sample experience a rise in  average  trading volumes on the buyback execution dates. 
Moreover,  standard univariate  tests show that  this increase is statistically significant for 
average  trading volumes  (Student Test p -value = 0.052) and median  trading volumes 
(Kruskal-Wallis Test p-value = 0.000). 
 
To pursue our investigations of the effects of repurchases on trading volumes, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
 
    Volumei,t = a + b Buyback i,t + d1 Pricei,t + d2 Volatilityi,t + d3 Market Capitalizationi,t +  ei,t    (11) 
 
where Volume represents  the daily number of shares traded on the first trading line. The 
parameter estimate that captures any systematic effect of buybacks on trading activity is the 
one associated with the Buyback variable, which is a binary variable equal to one if the firm 
repurchases some shares and zero otherwise. Note that we also use the Intensity variable in 
replacement of the Buyback variable to check whether our conclusions depend on the portion 
of buyback program reacquired on a given day. The control variables used in our regression 
model are rather standard: Price denotes  the  closing  price of the stock,  Volatility is the 
absolute open-close return of the stock, and Market Capitalization is the market value of the 
firm. 
 
Table 6 presents the OLS parameter estimates and associated p-values  for Equation (11). 
Consistent with the  univariate  tests, we find that repurchasing on a second trading l ine 
contributes to increase  trading activity  in the stock market (p-value = 0.001). We reach a 
similar conclusion when the portion of the buyback program reacquired on a given day, 
                                                 
23 In order not to give an excessive weight to firms with large trading volumes, we scale the liquidity measures in 
each sample by the firm’s unconditional average liquidity measure. As an illustration, consider firms A and B. 
Let firm A’s average trading volume be 100 (in million CHF), average trading volume on repurchase days be 
120, and average trading volume on non-repurchase days be 80. Let firm B’s average trading volume be 15 (in 
million CHF), average trading volume on repurchase days be 20, and average trading volume on non-repurchase 
days be 10. The scaled average trading volume on repurchase days is 1.20 for firm A and 1.33 for firm B and the 
scaled average trading volume on non-repurchase days is 0.80 for firm A and 0.66 for firm B.   24 
Intensity, is used in place of the repurchase-day dummy variable, Buyback. Furthermore, the 
signs of the coefficient estimates associated with the control variables are consistent with 
microstructure theory. Moreover, the subperiod analysis indicates that our results are robust 
over time. 
 
< Insert Table 6 > 
 
To study the liquidity effects of actual buybacks on the first trading line, we compile bid-ask 
spread and depth measures using trade and quote data over a 21-month period from October 
1, 2002 to June 30, 2004. Seventeen of our buyback programs occurred during this period. We 
collect d etailed intraday data for this subset of firms from the Bloomberg financial 
information network. For each firm over each trading day, we obtain the median measures 
across all trades on four liquidity variables: bid-ask quoted spread, relative bid-ask quoted 
spread, total depth in number of shares, and total depth in value. Bid-ask quoted spread is the 
difference between the lowest ask price and highest bid price. Relative bid-ask quoted spread 
is the quoted spread divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Total depth is the number of shares 
offered at the highest bid price plus the number of shares offered at the lowest ask price. Total 
depth in value is the number of shares at the bid and ask multiplied by their respective prices. 
Following prior research, we also use price, volatility and volume as control variables in our 
analysis. Price is the median transaction price across all trades during the day, volatility is the 
intraday volatility of trade-by-trade logarithmic returns across all trades, and volume is the 
daily trading volume in number of shares. 
 
We examine the liquidity effects using the following regression: 
 
Liquidityi,t = a + b Buybacki,t + d1 Pricei,t + d2 Volatility i,t + d3 Volumei,t +  ei,t      (12) 
 
where Liquidity represents alternatively the bid-ask quoted spread, relative bid-ask quoted 
spread, total depth in number of shares, and total depth in value. As in the Volume regression 
above, we also use the Intensity variable in replacement of the Buyback variable. Table 7 
presents the OLS parameter estimates and associated p-values for Equation (12). When the 
explained variable is Spread or Relative Spread, the estimated coefficient associated with the 
Buyback dummy variable or the  Intensity variable  is  negative and highly significant. This 
suggests that the spreads on the first trading line tend to be smaller when the company   25 
repurchases on the second trading line. When the explained variable is Total Depth or Total 
Depth in Value, the estimated coefficient associated with the Buyback dummy variable or the 
Intensity variable is positive and highly significant. This result also indicates that buyback 
activity on the second trading line have a beneficial effect on the firm liquidity on the first 
trading line. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on the control variables have generally 
the expected sign. In particular, higher volumes are associated with higher firm liquidity and 
higher volatility is associated with lower liquidity. Furthermore,  as expected,  price is 
positively correlated with spread and depth measures that are expressed in value. 
 
< Insert Table 7 > 
 
Results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are clear and unambiguous evidence that repurchases on 
second trading lines improve the liquidity of the repurchasing firms. We find that when one 
controls for the key variables affecting stock liquidity, trading volumes and total depth on the 
first trading lines tend to be higher on repurchase days and bid-ask spreads tend to be smaller 
on repurchase days. Our results are consistent with the presence of arbitrageurs taking 
simultaneous positions on both market segments. The evidence  is also supportive of the 
beneficial impact on market liquidity  resulting from new investors entering the market  in 
reaction to the firms’ actual repurchases. 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms to reacquire shares on a separate 
trading line where only the firm is allowed to buy shares. This temporary trading platform is 
opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange.  This method is 
called the Second Trading  Line and has been extensively used by Swiss companies since 
1997. We theoretically derive the buyback participation rules for every type of stock market 
participant and we show that it is never optimal for an individual investor to sell her shares on 
a second trading line. Using actual repurchase data from all buyback programs implemented 
through a second trading line on the Swiss stock market, we find that managers exhibit 
buyback implementation skills  for the majority of programs. We also report that the daily 
repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. In particular, we 
find that firms increase repurchasing in days following price drops and in advance of price   26 
increases. However, we reject the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis and find no evidence of 
firms increasing repurchases before releasing good news or after disclosing bad news. 
 
Since the second trading lines eliminate the adverse selection problem inherently associated 
with open market buybacks, it offers a unique opportunity to test the impact of buybacks on 
the liquidity of repurchasing firms. We empirically show that repurchases on second trading 
lines do have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of the underlying stock. We find that, after 
controlling for the key variables affecting stock liquidity, trading volumes and total depths on 
the first trading line tend to be higher on repurchase days and bid-ask spreads tend to be 
smaller on repurchase days. 
 
We have shown that second trading lines offer many attractive features to financial regulatory 
authorities and market participants.  The key advantage for regulatory bodies is that firms’ 
actual repurchases can be tracked in real time, which makes disclosure requirements totally 
unnecessary.  Furthermore, second trading lines  offer alternative trading platforms for all 
market participants; they  may provide from time to time arbitrage opportunities; and they 
allow investors to capture some undervaluation signals sent by the firms. Second trading lines 
also remove the pernicious effects of information asymmetry caused by the presence of an 
informed trader (i.e.,  the repurchasing firm).  In a time when open market buybacks are 
predominantly used to repurchase shares and are shown to have detrimental effects on stock 
market liquidity  (Brockman and Chung, 2001 and Ginglinger and Hamon, 2005), second 
trading lines offer an attractive replacement option for exchanges around the world.  
 
While the optimal level of information disclosure in financial markets remains a very 
debatable issue in the literature, recent changes in the regulation of repurchase activity in the 
US call for more disclosure. Indeed, according to the newly mandated disclosure rule (SEC 
Rule 10b-18), the number of shares and the average price paid by the repurchasing firms are 
required in quarterly and annual reports for periods ending after March 15, 2004. With this 
change in regulation, the U.S. buyback information environment evolves from one with  no 
disclosure requirement (a level 0  requirement) to a compulsory delayed disclosure 
environment (a level 1 disclosure). Similar disclosure environments are found for instance in 
Canada, France, Hong  Kong, and Japan. As exposed in this paper, a  level 2 requirement 
would be the i nstantaneous disclosure implemented through second trading lines. 
Conceptually, an even more stringent information disclosure requirement ( a  level 3    27 
requirement) would require a firm commitment and systematic preannouncement of the size 
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Number of Firms  31  8  20  13  189 
Number of Programs  55  15  40  19  - 
Market Capitalization (CHF Mio)  27,254.4  25,379.0  1,850.2  4,419.8  1,651.4 
Market-to-Book  3.39  3.47  2.83  2.37  2.20 
Program Length (trading days)  214.5  336.8  12.6  19.0  - 
Share Capital Reduction (%)  6.70  4.23  11.77  8.27  - 




on a Second Trading Line 
  Mean  Minimum   Maximum 
Program Size (CHF Mio)  1,026.54  21.5  6,000 
Final Completion Rate (%)  69.96  17.70  109.50 
Average Premium (%)  0.78  0.00  5.09 
Repurchase Days (%)  28.81  0.19  77.42 
First Quintile (%)  35.52  0.00  100.00 
Last Quintile (%)  17.36  0.00  64.52 
Monday (%)  17.55  0.00  27.78 
Tuesday (%)  21.55  0.00  66.67 
Wednesday (%)  21.75  0.00  100.00 
Thursday (%)  19.88  0.00  50.00 
Friday (%)  19.27  0.00  100.00 
 
Claimed Reasons for Repurchasing 
Shares on a Second Trading Line 
   Capital            100.00%     EPS                16.36%     P/E                  9.09%     Acquisitions      3.64% 
   Cash                 74.55%     Structure        16.36%     Signal             5.45%     Value                1.82% 
 
Note: This table presents some summary statistics for all  of  the companies that have repurchased shares 
(Repurchasing Firms) on the Swiss stock market between January 1993 and August 2004. Buyback programs 
are implemented either through a second trading line,  open market, tender offer, or distribution of tradable 
European put options. Non-Repurchasing Firms is a control sample that contains all of the firms included in the 
Swiss Performance Index that did not repurchase any shares over the sample period.  Market Capitalization, 
Market-to-Book,  Program Length, and Share  Capital Reduction are the average values for each acquisition 
method and, when applicable, for the control sample. CHF stands for Swiss Francs.  Share Cancellation 
Programs indicates the portion of programs leading to the cancellation of the shares.  Program Size is the 
maximum cost announced and authorized prior to the program implementation, Final Completion Rate is the 
percentage of the program that has been effectively repurchased at the end of the program, Average Premium is 
the weighted-average premium paid on the second trading line, Repurchase Days is the percentage of trading 
days with repurchase activities during the life of the program, and First Quintile and  Last Quintile are the 
percentage of trading days with repurchase activities during the first and final 20% of the program, respectively. 
Monday denotes the percentage of repurchase days that are Mondays, and so forth for the other days of the week. 
The reasons claimed by the repurchasing firms to motivate the  buybacks  are  Capital ( reduce capital),  Cash 
(distribute excess cash flows),  EPS (increase the earning-per-share ratio),  Structure (optimize the capital 
structure),  P/E (increase the price-earning ratio),  Signal (signal undervaluation),  Acquisitions (get shares to 
finance future acquisitions), and Value (create more value for shareholders). Firms can claim m ore than one 
reason at a time. 
   31 

















































Bad Timing  10  10  0.695  0.987  0.888  0.940 
 





























Bad Timing  18  18  0.671  0.983  0.891  0.916 
 
Note:  This table presents some descriptive statistics on  managers’  buyback implementation skills.  Our first 
measure of managers’ implementation skills (BIS) is obtained by dividing the actual cost of the program by the 
average cost of a  buyback  plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares.  Our second measure of 
managers’ implementation skills (OBIS) is obtained by dividing the actual cost of the program by the average 
cost of a buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares  except that the average price is 
computed over the period following a given repurchase day. For both measures, a ratio greater than one implies 
that there is implementation skills and a ratio smaller than one implies that there is no implementation skills. 
Significant t-statistics gives the number of programs for which the associated t-statistic is greater than 1.96 in 
absolute value. The t -statistics are computed using a bootstrapped approach based on  50,000  simulated 
equivalent repurchase strategies. 
   32 





































































































































































Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample PROBIT regression:  
Buybacki,t = a + b1 Ri,t-5,t -1 + b2 Ri,t + b3 Ri,t+1,t+5 + g1 Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g2 Newsi,t + g3 Newsi,t+1,t+5  
 + d1-5 Controlsi,t + ei,t 
Buybacki is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and Ri is the 
return of firm i. The variable News is a binary variable set to one if the firm makes a public announcement on a 
given day and zero otherwise. In the last two columns, the news variable is defined using earnings related news 
only. Controls represents a set of control variables including the firm’s market capitalization and market-to-book 
ratio, the program length and share capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run 
the regressions for all programs ( Whole Sample), as well as for programs with  significant  buyback 
implementation skills according to the BIS measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses 
have been computed using Huber-White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors. 
a indicates that the 
coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10
5. * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from 
zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level.    33 































































































































































































Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample PROBIT regression:  
Buybacki,t = a + b1 Ri,t-5,t -1 + b2 Ri,t + b3 Ri,t+1,t+5 + g1 Good Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g2 Good Newsi,t + g3 Good Newsi,t+1,t+5 + 
g4 Bad Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g5 Bad Newsi,t + g6 Bad Newsi,t+1,t+5 + d1-5 Controlsi,t + ei,t 
Buybacki is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and Ri is the 
return of firm i. Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one if the 
firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as good (respectively bad) if 
the  raw r eturn of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day.  In the last two 
columns, the news variables are defined using earnings related news only. Controls represents a set of control 
variables including the firm’s market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and share 
capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run the regressions for all programs   34 
(Whole Sample), as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills according to the BIS 
measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses have been computed using Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10
5. 
* (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. 
 
 































































































































































































Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample PROBIT regression:  
Buybacki,t = a + b1 Ri,t-5,t -1 + b2 Ri,t + b3 Ri,t+1,t+5 + g1 Good Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g2 Good Newsi,t + g3 Good Newsi,t+1,t+5 + 
g4 Bad Newsi,t-5,t-1 + g5 Bad Newsi,t + g6 Bad Newsi,t+1,t+5 + d1-5 Controlsi,t + ei,t   35 
Buybacki is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and Ri is the 
return of firm i. Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one if the 
firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as good (respectively bad) if 
the abnormal return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day. In the last two 
columns, the news variables are defined using earnings related news only. Controls represents a set of control 
variables including the firm’s market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and share 
capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run the regressions for all programs 
(Whole Sample), as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills according to the BIS 
measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses have been computed using Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10
5. 
* (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level.   36 
 
Table 6: Effects of Repurchases on Trading Activity 
 




First Half of the Sample 
 
 






























































































2  0.702  0.703  0.635  0.636  0.785  0.786 
Number of Observations  11,742  11,742  6,597  6,597  5,145  5,145 
 
Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample OLS regression:  
Volumei,t = a + b Buybacki,t + d1 Pricei,t + d2 Volatilityi,t + d3  Market Capitalizationi,t + ei,t 
Volume represents the daily number of shares traded on the first trading line. Buybacki is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise. 
Intensity is the fraction of the announced program size repurchased on a given day and is used in replacement of the Buyback variable. Price denotes the bid-ask midpoint 
price of the stock, Volatility is the absolute open-close return of the stock, and Market Capitalization is the firm  market value. The first half of the sample covers the 1997-
2001 periods (first 26 programs) and the second part of the sample covers the 2001-2004 period (last 27 programs). The p-values presented into parentheses have been 
computed using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level.   37 
Table 7: Effects of Repurchases on Corporate Liquidity 
 



































































































































2  0.534  0.534  0.530  0.528  0.651  0.650  0.503  0.494 
Number of Observations  7,324  7,324  7,324  7,324  7,324  7,324  7,324  7,324 
 
Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample OLS regression:  
Liquidityi,t = a + b Buyback i,t + d1 Pricei,t + d2 Volatilityi,t + d3  Volumei,t + ei,t 
Liquidity alternatively represents the acquiring firm’s bid-ask quoted spread, relative bid-ask quoted spread (quoted bid-ask spread divided by midpoint price), total depth in 
number of shares, and total depth in value on the first trading line. The depth variables are expressed in thousands. The alternative liquidity measures are the median values 
across all trades during the day. Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise. Intensity is the fraction of the announced 
program size repurchased on a given day and is used in replacement of the  Buyback variable. Price denotes the m edian transaction price across all trades during the day, 
Volatility is the intraday volatility of trade-by-trade logarithmic returns across all trades during the day, and Volume is the daily trading volume in number of shares. The p-
values presented into parentheses have been computed using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied 
by 10
5. * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. 
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Note: In the upper graph, the bars present the annual number of repurchase programs implemented by companies 
listed on the Swiss stock exchange between  January  1993 and  August  2004. The lower graphs  show the 
popularity of the different repurchase methods:  Open market,  tender offers, distributions of  European  put 





































































































































































































s  39 




    First Trading Line        Second Trading Line 
    1654 Sellers        12 Sellers 
    Price  Size  Time        Price  Size  Time 
    103.60  8455    (7)  09:45:52        -  -  - 
    103.50  47413  (40)  14:04:14        -  -  - 
    103.40  11956  (13)  11:07:19        -  -  - 
    103.30  14016  (10)  11:28:35        -  -  - 
    103.20  23160  (11)  10:50:27        -  -  - 
    103.10  23365    (8)  16:35:25        103.30  35000  (2)  09:34:28 
    103.00  151000 (205)  16:36:46        103.20  35000  (2)  09:34:23 
    102.90  74449  (35)  16:36:17        103.10  30000  (3)  15:55:33 
    102.80  43600  (13)  16:37:03        103.00  45000  (3)  15:55:25 
    102.70  9187    (7)  16:37:29        102.90  20000  (2)  16:37:51 
16:37:45  33407 (13)  102.60        16:35:32  5000  (1)  102.60     
16:30:04  82361   (7)  102.50        -  -  -     
15:41:51  13061   (3)  102.40        -  -  -     
16:36:17  17400   (5)  102.30        -  -  -     
14:21:42  13308   (4)  102.20        -  -  -     
15:56:12  30249   (6)  102.10        -  -  -     
12:57:02  33927 (13)  102.00        -  -  -     
12:22:01  15757   (4)  101.90        -  -  -     
08:43:17  9000   (3)  101.80        -  -  -     
12:53:15  22028   (4)  101.70        -  -  -     
Time  Size  Price        Time  Size  Price     




Note: This figure displays the concurrent order books on the first and second trading lines for UBS. The order books have been recorded on July 11, 2005 at 4:40 p.m. The 
first trading line is the standard trading line (ticker: UBSN) and the second trading line (ticker: UBSNE) is a temporary trading line established by the firm to repurchase 
shares in a tax-efficient way. Both trading lines are open on the Virt-X. E ach order book contains the selling orders in the upper part and the buying orders in the lower part. 
For each price (Price), we know the number of shares (Size), the number of orders for each price (indicated in parentheses), and the time when the order has been entered into 
the trading system (Time).   40 
 







































Note: These graphs represent the reserve premia for  individual investors (upper graphs), institutional investors 
and arbitrageurs (medium graphs), and tax-exempted institutional investors (lower graph). The reserve premium 
is defined as the percentage premium for which a given market participant is indifferent between tendering her 
shares on a second trading line program or directly selling them  in the stock market. The exact expressions for 
the reserve premia are presented in Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. For each market participant, we plot 
the associated reserve premium for a time period until the end of the fiscal year (t) ranging from 0 to 1 year, 
different risk-free interest rate levels, r = 1%, 3%, and 5%, and different income tax rates (tI) or capital gain tax 
rates (tG), 30% and 50%. The value of the current stock price (P) is assumed to be 100 and the nominal value of 
one share (V) is assumed to be 1. 
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Note: The four graphs present the daily Intensity of a buyback program, which is the fraction of the announced 
program size repurchased on a given day (vertical bars, left axis) and the daily current Stock Price in the stock 
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Note: The two upper graphs present the daily percentage Premium paid on the second trading line by Helvetia 
and Ciba Specialty Chemicals. The percentage premium  is the difference between the prices on the first and 
second trading lines divided by the stock price on the first trading line. The two lower graphs plot the daily 
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Appendix: Chronology of a Typical Repurchase Program on a Second Trading Line 
 
 
Repurchasing firm: UBS 
Repurchase method: Second trading line on the Virt-X exchange 
Investment bank in charge of the program: UBS Warburg 
Board of Directors decision of initiating a repurchase program: February 11, 2003 
Swiss Takeover Board authorizes the program: February 12, 2003 
Expected number of shares to be repurchased: 85,000,0000 
Maximum issued share capital reduction: 6.8% 
Maximum cost of the program: CHF5,000,000,000 
 
Starting date of the program: March 6, 2003 
First repurchase: March 6, 2003 
Last repurchase: January 26, 2004 
End date of the program: March 5, 2004 
Length of the program: 262 trading days 
Number of days with some repurchase (%): 108 trading days (41.2%) 
 
Actual repurchases: During this program, 59,482,000 shares were repurchased at an average price of CHF75.93 
for a value of CHF4,500,000,000. At the April 2004 annual general meeting, shareholders accepted to cancel the 
repurchased shares on July 2004. Consequently, the number of UBS shares has decreased to 1,125,400,202. 
 
Sources: Swiss Takeover Board (www.copa.ch) and UBS (www.ubs.com) websites and SWX Swiss Exchange.  The FAME Research Paper Series 
 
The International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME) is a private foundation created 
in 1996 on the initiative of 21 leading partners of the finance and technology community, together with three 
Universities of the Lake Geneva Region (Switzerland). FAME is about Research, Doctoral Training, and Executive 
Education with “interfacing” activities such as the FAME lectures, the Research Day/Annual Meeting, and the 
Research Paper Series. 
 
The FAME Research Paper Series includes three types of contributions: First, it reports on the research carried out 
at FAME by students and research fellows; second, it includes research work contributed by Swiss academics and 
practitioners interested in a wider dissemination of their ideas, in practitioners' circles in particular; finally, 
prominent international contributions of particular interest to our constituency are included on a regular basis. 
Papers with strong practical implications are preceded by an Executive Summary, explaining in non-technical terms 
the question asked, discussing its relevance and outlining the answer provided.  
 
Martin Hoesli is acting Head of the Research Paper Series. Please email any comments or queries to the following 
address: Martin.Hoesli@hec.unige.ch. 
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  Alexandre ZIEGLER, HEC, University of Lausanne, and FAME; François-Xavier DELALOYE, HEC, University of Lausanne; 
Michel HABIB, Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich 
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N°155  Can Information heterogeneity Explain the Exchange Rate Determination? 
  Philippe Bacchetta, Study Center Gerzensee, University of Lausanne, FAME & CEPR; Eric van Wincoop, University of Virginia, 
NBER 
  
N°154  Testing for Stochastic Dominance Efficiency 
  Olivier SCAILLET, HEC, University of Geneva and FAME; Nikolas TOPALOGLOU, HEC, University of Geneva  
  
N°153  International Conditional Asset Allocation under Real Time Uncertainty 
  Laurent BARRAS, HEC, University of Geneva and FAME 
  
N°152  Debt-Equity Choice in Europe 
  Philippe GAUD, HEC, University of Geneva and FAME; Martin HOESLI, HEC, University of Geneva, FAME and University of 
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International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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